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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Kelvin X. Morris was convicted of first-degree murder
and robbery and sentenced to death in 1983 following a jury
trial in Pennsylvania state court. Morris made several
unsuccessful attempts to overturn his convictions and
sentence in state court before petitioning the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for a
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writ of habeas corpus in 2001. After conducting an
evidentiary hearing, the District Court found that while
defending Morris at his original trial, his counsel had
simultaneously represented Morris‟s brother, who was also a
suspect in the murder, in an unrelated civil matter. The
District Court concluded that trial counsel‟s concurrent
representation was an actual conflict of interest that deprived
Morris of effective assistance of counsel, and therefore
granted him a new trial.
The Commonwealth appeals, contending the District
Court erred in holding the evidentiary hearing and in ordering
a new trial. Although we will affirm the District Court‟s
decision to conduct a hearing, we will vacate the order of the
District Court and remand for further consideration of
Morris‟s request for a new trial.
I
A
The lengthy history of this case begins tragically with
the senseless and brutal murder of Robert McDonald some 30
years ago. At approximately 3:00 a.m. on the morning of
August 9, 1980, Philadelphia police discovered a broken
window at the auto parts store that McDonald managed.
When McDonald arrived at the store, he inspected the
premises with an officer but found nothing else amiss. After
the officer left, McDonald called a window repairman,
William Linaberry, who met McDonald at the store at
approximately 4:30 a.m.
As Linaberry worked on the window, he noticed a man
and a group of adolescent boys at a gas station across the
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street. The man, who was carrying a yellow plastic bag,
eventually approached McDonald and Linaberry and asked
about the broken window. As they spoke, the man drew a
handgun from the bag and demanded money from McDonald.
When McDonald asked, “What money?,” the man shot and
killed him. Linaberry avoided harm by hiding underneath his
van.
Following the shooting, police showed Linaberry
several hundred photographs, but he initially was unable to
identify a suspect. Several days later, police interviewed
Ronald Johnson, who was one of the boys whom Linaberry
had observed at the gas station before the murder. According
to Johnson, who was twelve years old at the time of the
interview, a man approached the group at the gas station and
told them to leave the area before heading across the street
toward the auto parts store. Although Johnson fled the scene
as instructed, he told police that he turned as he ran and
watched the man approach McDonald and Linaberry and
speak with the two men before shooting one of them.
Police were able to draw a composite sketch of the
shooter based on Johnson‟s description. Police then showed a
new array of photographs to Linaberry and Joseph Tyrone
Flowers, who was another boy at the gas station. After
viewing the new photographs, both Linaberry and Flowers
identified Artie Morris, Kelvin Morris‟s brother, as the man
who had approached them at the gas station.1 Kelvin‟s

1

For the sake of clarity, hereinafter we refer to
Petitioner Kelvin X. Morris as “Kelvin” and to his brother,
Artie Morris, as “Artie.”
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picture had not been included in any of the earlier photo
arrays.
Police obtained a warrant for Artie‟s arrest and
questioned both Artie and his live-in girlfriend. Both
informed police that Kelvin had arrived at Artie‟s apartment
on the afternoon of August 9, told them that he was in trouble
for a shooting, and asked to stay with them for several days.
Artie‟s girlfriend also indicated that family members had
implicated Kelvin in the shooting.
Based on this new information, police showed
Linaberry a new set of photographs that included a picture of
Kelvin. Linaberry immediately identified Kelvin as the
shooter, explaining that his previous identification had been
incorrect because Kelvin and Artie resembled one another.
Police also showed new photo arrays to Johnson and Flowers,
both of whom had previously chosen Artie. Although
Johnson this time identified Kelvin as the man who
approached him at the gas station prior to the shooting,
Flowers continued to maintain that Artie was the shooter.
On the strength of these new identifications, police
obtained a warrant for Kelvin‟s arrest and located him in
Suffolk, Virginia several months later, where he was being
held on unrelated armed robbery charges. During an
interview with Suffolk police following his arrest, Kelvin
acknowledged his involvement in the robbery and murder of
McDonald. Kelvin‟s roommate in Virginia, James Willie,
also told police that Kelvin had confessed to shooting a man
while robbing an auto parts store in Philadelphia. After he
was tried and convicted on the Virginia charges, Kelvin was
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extradited to Pennsylvania to stand trial for McDonald‟s
murder.
B
On November 3, 1983, a seventeen-day jury trial
commenced in the Philadelphia County Court of Common
Pleas. When Kelvin‟s first lawyer was forced to withdraw
prior to trial because of illness, attorney Leon Tucker was
appointed. Unbeknownst to the court, however, Tucker was
simultaneously representing Kelvin‟s brother, Artie, in an
unrelated civil matter in which Artie was seeking monetary
damages. The trial court was never apprised of Tucker‟s
concurrent representation of both Kelvin and Artie.2
At trial, the Commonwealth‟s evidence consisted
largely of the eyewitness identifications of Kelvin and his
own inculpatory statements. Linaberry identified Kelvin as
the shooter, and Johnson, who was fifteen at the time of trial,
testified that it was Kelvin who approached the group of boys
at the gas station prior to the murder and told them to leave
the area. Flowers, who consistently maintained that it was
Artie who had approached the group, did not testify.
James Willie, Kelvin‟s erstwhile roommate in
Virginia, testified that Kelvin had admitted to shooting one of
It was clear at the time of Kelvin‟s 1983 trial that
Tucker had an ethical obligation to disclose this conflict to
the trial court. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 48586 (1978) (“[D]efense attorneys have the ethical obligation,
upon discovering a conflict of interest, to advise the court at
once of the problem.”).
2
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two men while robbing an auto parts store in Philadelphia.
According to Willie, Kelvin had explained that one of the
men had escaped by running and hiding under a truck. The
Commonwealth also called Thomas Newsome, the Suffolk,
Virginia detective who interviewed Kelvin after his arrest.
Newsome testified that when questioned about the shooting,
Kelvin acknowledged robbing and killing McDonald to “keep
up with the crowd.”
Kelvin‟s defense centered around a theory of mistaken
identity. Attorney Tucker called two witnesses who testified
that Kelvin was not the man who shot McDonald. William
Meekins, who was jogging near the store at the time of the
murder, testified that he saw a man standing nearby holding a
bag at about the time of the shooting who looked nothing like
Kelvin. Lamont Bruce, a “close” friend of Kelvin, testified
that he was living near the store at the time of the murder.
Bruce told the jury that he heard two shots that morning and
looked out his window to see three younger men running
away. According to Bruce, none of the fleeing men was
Kelvin.
When cross-examining Linaberry, attorney Tucker
established that Linaberry had initially identified someone
other than Kelvin as the shooter. However, Tucker did not
elicit or otherwise reveal to the jury during cross-examination
that the man Linaberry identified was someone who
resembled Kelvin, namely, Kelvin‟s brother and Tucker‟s
client, Artie Morris. In fact, Tucker actually objected when
the Commonwealth, on re-direct, asked Linaberry to name the
person he initially identified. Nor did Tucker call Flowers,
who had maintained his identification of Artie as the man
who approached the group at the gas station.
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During closing arguments, Tucker attacked
Linaberry‟s and Johnson‟s identifications, arguing that they
did not have a good opportunity to see the shooter‟s face and
pointing out that both had given inconsistent identifications.
Tucker also attacked the credibility of Willie, Kelvin‟s former
roommate, who had been arrested for forging checks
belonging to Kelvin‟s uncle. Tucker did not, however, argue
or imply that the shooter was his other client, Artie Morris.
On November 30, 1983, the jury convicted Kelvin of
first-degree murder and robbery. Following a penalty
hearing, the jury found two aggravating circumstances and
recommended a sentence of death on the murder count. After
a lengthy delay in resolving several post-trial motions, on
September 8, 1987, the trial court formally imposed the jury‟s
death sentence, along with a consecutive term of ten-totwenty years imprisonment on the robbery charge.
C
After new appellate counsel was appointed, Kelvin
sought direct review of his convictions and sentence,
asserting numerous errors. Although Kelvin argued on appeal
that Tucker‟s performance at trial was ineffective for several
reasons, he did not raise the issue of Tucker‟s conflict of
interest in either his post-trial motions or on direct appeal.
On September 22, 1989, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
affirmed Kelvin‟s convictions and death sentence. See
Commonwealth v. Morris, 564 A.2d 1226 (Pa. 1989).
Kelvin then sought to overturn his convictions and
sentence under the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act
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(PCRA), 42 PA. STAT. ANN. § 9541 et seq. Kelvin filed a pro
se PCRA petition on April 2, 1990, which a new courtappointed attorney amended on October 18, 1993. Although
Kelvin claimed that Tucker‟s trial performance was
constitutionally ineffective for various reasons, he nowhere
mentioned Tucker‟s concurrent representation of Artie.
Kelvin was denied PCRA relief on January 18, 1995, and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court later affirmed that ruling. See
Commonwealth v. Morris, 684 A.2d 1037 (Pa. 1996), cert.
denied, 521 U.S. 1106 (1997).
On November 2, 1996, Artie died. Just over one
month later, Kelvin filed a second pro se PCRA petition
claiming, for the first time, that Tucker‟s simultaneous
representation of Artie in the civil suit had created a conflict
of interest that deprived Kelvin of the effective assistance of
counsel during trial. Kelvin requested an evidentiary hearing
and argued that the new claims raised in his second PCRA
petition were not time-barred because Pennsylvania‟s
“relaxed waiver rule” permitted the court to review untimely
claims in capital cases. The Philadelphia County Court of
Common Pleas refused to hold a hearing and dismissed
Kelvin‟s second PCRA petition on December 21, 1999,
holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review his claims
because the petition had been filed beyond the PCRA‟s oneyear statute of limitations. See 42 PA. STAT. ANN. § 9545(b).
On May 1, 2003, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court‟s conclusion that Kelvin‟s second PCRA
petition was time-barred. See Commonwealth v. Morris, 822
A.2d 684 (Pa. 2003).
D
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On June 20, 2001, Kelvin filed the present petition for
federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.3
Kelvin‟s § 2254 petition raised many of the same claims as
his second PCRA petition and likewise alleged that Tucker‟s
concurrent representation of both Kelvin and Artie had
created an actual conflict of interest that deprived Kelvin of
effective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of the
trial.
The Commonwealth initially argued that the claims
presented in Kelvin‟s § 2254 petition were procedurally
defaulted because he had failed to comply with the PCRA‟s
one-year statute of limitation.
As such, contended the
Commonwealth, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to
review Kelvin‟s § 2254 claims because the denial of his
claims was supported by an independent and adequate state
3

This habeas petition is actually Kelvin‟s second. On
October 28, 1997, Kelvin filed an initial § 2254 petition in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania while his second PCRA
petition was still pending. Kelvin‟s first § 2254 petition was
dismissed without prejudice as a “mixed petition” under Rose
v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), on March 18, 1998. When
Kelvin filed the present habeas petition in June 2001, the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania stayed proceedings pending
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court‟s consideration of the denial
of Kelvin‟s second PCRA petition. When the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief in May
2003, this Court transferred Kelvin‟s § 2254 petition to Judge
Rodriguez of the District of New Jersey, sitting by
designation in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, for further
consideration.
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ground. The District Court disagreed, holding that our
decision in Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700 (3d Cir. 2005),
effectively precluded the Commonwealth‟s procedural default
argument.
In Bronshtein, we explained that the PCRA‟s one-year
statute of limitations was not an adequate state bar to federal
habeas review of claims defaulted prior to, at the very least,
October 20, 1998. Id at 709. Before that date, Pennsylvania
courts frequently applied a “relaxed waiver” rule in capital
cases. Id. In other words, courts refused to enforce
procedural rules—such as the PCRA‟s one-year statute of
limitations—in capital cases because of the “overwhelming
public interest in preventing unconstitutional executions.” Id.
at 708 (quoting Commonwealth v. McKenna, 383 A.2d 174,
180-81 (Pa. 1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although a trio of Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions in
1998 and 1999 interred the relaxed waiver doctrine, see, e.g,
Commonwealth v. Banks, 726 A.2d 374 (Pa. 1999), we
observed in Bronshtein that it was not clear that the rule
would be unavailable as of October 20, 1998—the date of
Bronshtein‟s default. See 404 F.3d at 709-10. Because the
PCRA‟s one-year statute of limitations “was not firmly
established and regularly followed” as of that date, we held it
was an inadequate state bar to federal habeas review of
Bronshtein‟s claims. Id.
Applying Bronshtein to the present case, the District
Court held that the PCRA‟s one-year statute of limitations
was not an adequate state bar to federal habeas review of
Kelvin‟s claims because his default had occurred, at the latest,
in 1996—well before the Bronshtein petitioner‟s default.
Morris v. Beard, No. 01-3070, 2007 WL 1795689, at *12-*13
(E.D. Pa. June 20, 2007). Indeed, the Commonwealth
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eventually conceded that our holding in Bronshtein was fatal
to its procedural default argument. Id. at *12 n.18.
Turning to the merits of Kelvin‟s § 2254 petition, the
District Court vacated his death sentence on June 20, 2007
after finding that Tucker had provided ineffective assistance
of counsel during the penalty phase for reasons unrelated to
the alleged conflict of interest at trial. See Morris, 2007 WL
1795689, at *14-*36. The Commonwealth has not appealed
the decision to vacate Kelvin‟s death sentence.
See
Appellant‟s Br. at 11 n.7.
The District Court next considered what it termed
Kelvin‟s “primary” argument: that his convictions must be
vacated because Tucker‟s concurrent representation of Artie
created an actual conflict of interest that deprived him of
effective assistance of counsel at trial. See Morris, 2007 WL
1795689, at *37. After reviewing the trial record, the District
Court found significant evidence suggesting that Tucker‟s
loyalties to his client Artie—together with Tucker‟s own
financial interest in Artie‟s civil suit—led him to forego “the
most compelling and comprehensive defense,” id. at *37:
painting Artie as the shooter. See generally, id. at *37-*43.
Significantly, the District Court determined that there was a
causal nexus between Tucker‟s conflict of interest and his
failure to identify Artie as the shooter before hearing Tucker‟s
testimony in this regard. See id. at *43 (holding not only that
a conflict existed, but “that it adversely affected his counsel‟s
performance”).
The District Court also observed that the
Commonwealth did not dispute that Tucker simultaneously
represented both Kelvin and his brother Artie. Id. at *39.
Nevertheless, the District Court concluded that “more
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development of the existence and scope of the attorney client
relationship between [Tucker] and Artie is required before
relief can be granted.” Id. at *43. Accordingly, the District
Court exercised its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) to
hold an evidentiary hearing on that issue. Id. at *44.
E
The District Court held an evidentiary hearing on
October 24, 2007, and Tucker was the only witness to testify.
Tucker‟s testimony, together with several exhibits, confirmed
that he had represented Artie in a civil suit on a contingencyfee basis from September 1983 until the case was settled in
August 1985.4
This period coincided with Tucker‟s
representation of Kelvin during his seventeen-day jury trial in
November 1983. Tucker also confirmed that because the trial
court was never advised of the matter, it did not conduct a
colloquy on the record to determine whether Kelvin was
willing to waive Tucker‟s conflict. Nevertheless, Tucker
maintained that he had discussed the situation with both
Kelvin and Artie and that both had consented to his dual
representation.

The hearing revealed that Artie‟s suit concerned an
eye injury he received while incarcerated in a Philadelphia
city jail. Artie first approached Tucker about representing
him in August 1983. In September of that year, Artie, Artie‟s
mother, and Tucker all signed a contingency-fee agreement
granting Tucker 35% of any financial award or settlement
Artie obtained. Artie eventually settled his suit in 1985 for
$55,000, and Tucker received $19,500 in fees for his efforts.
4
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Tucker also testified that he and Kelvin discussed trial
strategy “extensively” both prior to and during trial.
According to Tucker, Kelvin was quite protective of Artie.
For that reason, Tucker explained, it was unlikely that Kelvin
would have allowed him to argue that Artie was the actual
shooter. Tucker further testified that he likely would have
acceded to Kelvin‟s desire not to implicate his brother in the
murder as a matter of trial strategy.
Although Tucker provided some probative testimony
on direct examination by Kelvin‟s counsel, the
Commonwealth‟s cross-examination proceeded in fits and
starts. Each time the Commonwealth tried to probe whether,
in fact, Tucker failed to identify Artie as the shooter because
of his conflict of interest (or for some unrelated reason),
Kelvin‟s counsel objected. See, e.g., App. at 121-28. These
objections resulted in several colloquies with the District
Court regarding the scope of the evidentiary hearing. The net
result was that the District Court‟s pre-hearing conclusion
that Tucker‟s conflict “adversely affected” his representation
of Kelvin prevented Tucker from testifying freely about that
critical issue.
Based on Tucker‟s testimony and the record as a
whole, the District Court held that Tucker‟s simultaneous
representation of Artie and Kelvin constituted an actual
conflict that led Tucker to eschew the objectively plausible
alternative defense strategy of portraying Artie as the shooter.
After rejecting the Commonwealth‟s argument that Kelvin
had knowingly and intelligently waived the conflict during
private conversations with Tucker, the District Court granted
Kelvin habeas relief on his conflict-of-interest claim, vacated
his murder conviction, and remanded the matter to state court
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for a new trial. Kelvin‟s remaining claims were dismissed
without prejudice as moot.
II
The Commonwealth appeals, arguing that the District
Court erred in three respects. First, the Commonwealth
claims the District Court erred in holding an evidentiary
hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) because Kelvin did not
diligently develop the factual basis for his conflict-of-interest
claim in Pennsylvania state court. Next, the Commonwealth
argues the District Court erroneously found that Kelvin did
not waive his right to conflict-free counsel. Finally, the
Commonwealth attacks the merits of the District Court‟s
conflict-of-interest analysis, arguing that Kelvin did not
demonstrate that Tucker‟s conflict led him to avoid pursuing
a plausible alternative defense strategy.
Although we review the District Court‟s decision to
hold an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion, see
United States v. Lilly, 536 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008), our
consideration of the District Court‟s legal conclusions is
plenary, Slutzker v. Johnson, 393 F.3d 373, 378 (3d Cir.
2004). We review any findings of fact drawn from the
evidentiary hearing for clear error. Rolan v. Vaughn, 445
F.3d 671, 677 (3d Cir. 2006). To the extent that state court
factual findings are at issue in this habeas appeal, we presume
them to be correct and will disturb them only upon a showing
of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C.
§2254(e)(1); Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 290 (3d Cir.
2000).
III
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We first consider the Commonwealth‟s contention that
the District Court erred by granting Kelvin an evidentiary
hearing on his conflict-of-interest claim.
Our inquiry
proceeds in two stages. First, we must determine whether the
hearing was barred by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214. If it was not, we then consider whether the
District Court‟s decision to grant a hearing was an abuse of its
discretion. We address each issue in turn.
A
Pursuant to AEDPA, district courts retain discretion to
grant evidentiary hearings in federal habeas proceedings,
subject to certain restrictions. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550
U.S. 465, 473 (2007). Of primary significance in Kelvin‟s
case is 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), which generally prohibits
evidentiary hearings where the petitioner “has failed to
develop the factual basis of a claim in state court
proceedings.” Under § 2254(e)(2), “a habeas court is barred
from holding an evidentiary hearing unless the petitioner was
diligent in his attempt to develop a factual basis for his claim
in the state court.” Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 392
(3d Cir. 2010); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 435
(2000).5
5

Irrespective of a petitioner‟s diligence, a district court
may also hold a hearing if the petitioner can satisfy the
criteria set forth in § 2254(e)(2)(A)-(B). See Palmer v.
Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2010). Kelvin does
not rely on those subsections to support the District Court‟s
decision to hold an evidentiary hearing in his case.
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The principles of federalism and comity that underlie
AEDPA in general—and § 2254(e)(2) in particular—demand
that a petitioner first afford the state court a fair opportunity
to develop and adjudicate his claims before seeking federal
habeas relief. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 436-37; see also
O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45 (1999).
Accordingly, whether a petitioner first pursued an evidentiary
hearing in state court in the manner provided by state law is
central to the diligence analysis under § 2254(e)(2).
Williams, 529 U.S. at 437.
In this appeal, the parties agree that Kelvin sought an
evidentiary hearing on his conflict-of-interest claim in state
court when he filed his second PCRA petition in 1996. The
state court, however, denied Kelvin a hearing and dismissed
his petition without addressing its merits after deeming it
untimely under the PCRA‟s one-year statute of limitations.
Though the District Court recognized that the state court had
dismissed the claim as time-barred, it reiterated its finding
that the PCRA‟s statute of limitations was an inadequate bar
to federal relief and thus concluded that Kelvin had made a
sufficient attempt to develop the record in state court.
Accordingly, the District Court held that § 2254(e)(2) did not
bar a hearing.
Noting the lengthy delay and suspicious timing of
Kelvin‟s conflict-of-interest claim, the Commonwealth argues
that Kelvin was anything but diligent in developing his
claim‟s factual predicate. The Commonwealth now concedes,
as it must in light of Bronshtein, that Kelvin‟s conflict of
interest claim is not procedurally defaulted. Nevertheless, it
contends that the standard for determining whether a state
procedural rule is an adequate bar to federal habeas relief is
distinct from the analysis of whether a petitioner was diligent
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in developing a particular claim under § 2254(e)(2). The
Commonwealth asserts that the District Court mistakenly
conflated the two analyses and held erroneously that Kelvin
had been diligent in developing his conflict-of-interest claim
simply because it found the PCRA‟s time bar inadequate.
According to the Commonwealth, Kelvin‟s thirteen-year
delay dooms his request for a hearing, regardless of whether
the PCRA‟s statute of limitations is valid.
The Commonwealth‟s argument is not without force.
It strains credulity to say that Kelvin “diligently” developed
his conflict-of-interest claim in the traditional sense of the
word.
Despite knowing of Tucker‟s concurrent
representation during his 1983 trial, Kelvin waited until 1996
to raise the issue. In doing so, he passed up numerous
opportunities to make his claim; neither his post-trial motions,
nor his direct appeal, nor his first PCRA petition mention
Tucker‟s conflict. Conveniently, it was not until November
1996, just one month after Artie died, that Kelvin first
claimed that Tucker‟s dual representation created a conflict
that led him to avoid portraying Artie as the shooter.
Nevertheless, we are constrained to agree with the
District Court that Kelvin was “diligent” in the technical
sense that the term is used for purposes of § 2254(e)(2). As
the Commonwealth points out, we observed in Wilson v.
Beard, 426 F.3d 653 (3d Cir. 2005), that the standards for
determining procedural default and diligence under §
2254(e)(2) are not coterminous. Id. at 665 n.10. Yet we
further explained that the two standards are “analytically
linked.” Id. at 665 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 432). Thus,
when “a petitioner requests a hearing to develop the record on
a claim in state court, and if the state courts . . . deny that
request on the basis of an inadequate state ground, the
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petitioner has not „failed to develop the factual basis of [the]
claim in State court proceedings‟ for purposes of
§2254(e)(2).” Id. (brackets in original).6
This is precisely the scenario we confront in this
appeal. As noted above, in assessing a petitioner‟s diligence,
we focus on whether he sought an evidentiary hearing in the
manner required by state law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 437.
Here, Kelvin did so in his second PCRA petition by raising
Tucker‟s conflict of interest, submitting preliminary evidence
on the issue, and requesting an evidentiary hearing to develop
the claim further. Thus, this is not a case where the petitioner
never raised the claim or never sought a hearing in state court,
or where the petitioner was “given a hearing on a claim in
state court but nonetheless fail[ed] to fully develop the
record.” Wilson, 426 F.3d at 665 n.10.7 Rather, it is a case
6

The Commonwealth attempts to distinguish Wilson
by suggesting our holding there was predicated on the fact
that the petitioner‟s untimely claim was based on newly
discovered evidence. Kelvin‟s case is different, argues the
Commonwealth, because he had the information necessary to
bring his conflict-of-interest claim in 1983. We disagree
because nothing in Wilson implies that our finding of
diligence turned on the petitioner‟s newly discovered
evidence. Rather, our decision was based on the conclusion
that Wilson, like Kelvin, had been denied a state evidentiary
hearing on his claim solely because of an inadequate state
procedural rule. See 426 F.3d at 665-66. The factual
distinction highlighted by the Commonwealth is thus
immaterial.
7

The Commonwealth cites Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d
416 (3d Cir. 2007), for the proposition that a state court‟s
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refusal to hear a claim based on a subsequently invalidated
state procedural rule does not cure a habeas petitioner‟s prior
lack of diligence. In Taylor, the petitioner sought a PCRA
hearing in state court on numerous claims, including a
competency claim that he had already raised and for which he
had already received an evidentiary hearing. See 504 F.3d at
436-37. The state court rejected all of the claims as
procedurally defaulted.
Before this Court, the Taylor petitioner cited Wilson
and argued that he had been diligent with respect to his
competency claim because the state procedural rule was
inadequate. We disagreed, finding the procedural grounds on
which the state court rejected the claim to be inadequate only
as to newly raised claims, not as to the previously litigated
competency claim. Id. (“Taylor‟s competency claim had
been fully litigated well before he sought to have the second
PCRA court consider his new evidence [on the competency
claim]. To the extent that the state procedural default of
Taylor‟s claims was inadequate, it only bears on the claims
that were new to his second PCRA petition.”). Unlike the
petitioner in Taylor, Kelvin never received a hearing on his
conflict claim in state court, though he did request one.
Accordingly, Taylor provides no support for the
Commonwealth‟s effort to evade Wilson, where we stated that
when “a petitioner requests a hearing to develop the record on
a claim in state court, and if the state courts . . . deny that
request on the basis of an inadequate state ground, the
petitioner has not „failed to develop the factual basis of [the]
claim in State court proceedings‟ for purposes of
§2254(e)(2).” 426 F.3d at 665 (brackets in original).
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where the petitioner was denied a hearing on his claim solely
because the state court applied an inadequate state procedural
rule.
One might argue that Kelvin‟s failure to comply with
the PCRA‟s one-year statute of limitations means that he did
not seek a hearing “in the manner prescribed by state law.”
Williams, 529 U.S. at 427. But such an argument runs
headlong into our holding in Bronshtein, where we observed
that the PCRA‟s time bar was neither “firmly established” nor
“regularly followed” at the time Kelvin filed his second
PCRA petition. 404 F.3d at 709-10. Because of the
uncertainty surrounding Pennsylvania‟s use of the “relaxedwaiver rule” at that time, it was effectively impossible for
Kelvin to fail to comply with Pennsylvania law on statute of
limitations grounds when filing his second PCRA petition. In
Williams, the Supreme Court explained that a finding of
diligence would turn on whether a petitioner “made a
reasonable attempt” to pursue his claim “in light of the
information available at the time.” 529 U.S. at 435. With no
“firmly established and regularly applied rule” clearly barring
Kelvin‟s lengthy delay, Bronshtein, 404 F.3d at 708, his
belated hearing request was an acceptable attempt to pursue
his claim in light of the information available to him at the
time of filing. Because the Pennsylvania state courts failed to
hold a hearing and rule on Kelvin‟s conflict-of-interest claim
“for some reason unrelated to [his] diligence, § 2254(e)(2)
[does] not apply and a new evidentiary hearing [is]
permitted.” Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 436 (3d Cir.
2007).
As the Commonwealth correctly argues, merely
because a petitioner has complied with state law when
seeking an evidentiary hearing does not mean that he has
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been diligent for purposes of § 2254(e)(2). The jurisdictional
standard for procedural default of § 2254(a) and the
evidentiary hearing standard of § 2254(e)(2) are distinct
provisions that will frequently require separate analyses. But
where, as here, a state court gives no reason for denying a
petitioner‟s hearing request other than his failure to comply
with a subsequently invalidated state statute of limitations, we
cannot say that the petitioner was not diligent for purposes of
§ 2254(e)(2). Accordingly, we hold that § 2254(e)(2) did not
prohibit the District Court from conducting an evidentiary
hearing on Kelvin‟s conflict-of-interest claim.
B
Whenever § 2254(e)(2) does not bar an evidentiary
hearing, a district court retains discretion to conduct one,
though this discretion is not unbounded. Landrigan, 550 U.S.
at 468; Palmer, 592 F.3d at 393. The Supreme Court
instructs that “[i]n deciding whether to grant an evidentiary
hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing
could enable an applicant to prove the petition‟s factual
allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to
federal habeas relief.” Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 474. We have
interpreted this to require a petitioner to make a “prima facie
showing” that “would enable [him] to prevail on the merits of
the asserted claim.” Palmer, 592 F.3d at 393. However, “if
the record refutes the applicant‟s factual allegations or
otherwise precludes habeas relief,” no evidentiary hearing is
required. Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 474.
We have little trouble concluding that the District
Court‟s decision to hold a hearing was not an abuse of its
discretion on the facts of this case. Kelvin‟s petition
explained the circumstances of Tucker‟s concurrent
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representation of Artie in the fall of 1983 and alleged a
conflict of interest. As the District Court thoroughly
explained, the petition‟s allegations, if proven, set forth a
prima facie case for granting Kelvin habeas relief on this
basis.
See Morris, 2007 WL 1795689, at *37-*44.
Moreover, once the Commonwealth‟s procedural default
argument was dismissed, nothing in the record clearly
precluded a finding that Kelvin was eligible for habeas relief.
When considering whether to hold a hearing, we have
instructed district “courts [to] focus on whether a new
evidentiary hearing would be meaningful, in that a new
hearing would have the potential to advance the petitioner‟s
claim.” Campbell, 209 F.3d at 287. In the present case, it
was clear that an evidentiary hearing would prove invaluable.
The District Court recognized the need for further factual
development of the nature and extent of the attorney-client
relationship that existed between Tucker and Artie in the fall
of 1983. Morris, 2007 WL 1795689, at *43. Specifically, it
was necessary to define with precision the nature and duration
of Tucker‟s involvement in Artie‟s civil suit. Furthermore, as
we shall explain, critical issues of material fact remain as to
whether the alternative strategy of blaming Artie for the
shooting was plausible under the circumstances. For these
reasons, the District Court‟s decision to hold an evidentiary
hearing on Kelvin‟s conflict-of-interest claim was not an
abuse of discretion.
IV
The Commonwealth next argues that the District Court
erred in ordering a new trial because Kelvin waived Tucker‟s
conflict. It is well established that where a waiver is validly
made and accepted by the trial court, “the defendant may
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[not] later successfully complain about a conflict of interest.”
United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742, 749 n.10 (3d Cir.
1991) (citing United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084,
1143, n.84 (3d Cir. 1990)). Less clear is what happens in
situations such as this one, where counsel testified that he
discussed his dual representation with his clients, but did not
disclose his conflict to the trial court.
The Commonwealth argues that the absence of an onthe-record colloquy by the trial court does not automatically
preclude a finding that Kelvin validly waived Tucker‟s
conflict. It points to the federal court evidentiary hearing,
where Tucker testified that he privately advised both Kelvin
and Artie of the dual representation. According to Tucker,
both men wanted him to continue representing them despite
the conflict. The Commonwealth thus contends that Tucker‟s
hearing testimony was sufficient to establish that Kelvin
waived Tucker‟s conflict in spite of the fact that the state trial
court never made a finding to that effect. Kelvin, on the other
hand, contends that a trial court must always conduct an onthe-record colloquy for a defendant‟s waiver to be valid.
Under Kelvin‟s approach, a conflicted attorney such as
Tucker could never obtain a valid waiver from his client
without the participation of the trial court.
We agree with the Commonwealth that the absence of
an on-the-record colloquy does not automatically preclude a
valid waiver of a conflict of interest. Such a colloquy is the
preferred course, however, and we encourage counsel to
promptly disclose to courts any conflicts of interest that might
arise.
The parties also disagree regarding the burden of proof
on the waiver issue. The Commonwealth argues that because
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Kelvin made no objection at trial, he must prove that he did
not waive Tucker‟s conflict. See Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77,
92 (2004); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1938)
(“Where a defendant, without counsel, acquiesces in a trial
resulting in his conviction and later seeks release by the
extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus, the burden of proof
rests upon him to establish that he did not competently and
intelligently waive his constitutional right to assistance of
counsel.”). Kelvin, by contrast, argues that because the trial
court made no findings as to waiver, the Commonwealth must
first prove the existence of a waiver before the burden shifts
to him to disprove it. See Zuck v. Alabama, 588 F.2d 436,
440 (5th Cir. 1979) (“[I]f the record is silent on whether the
defendant received the information required [to obtain a valid
waiver] . . . then the State must bear the burden of showing
that the waiver was knowing and intelligent.”).
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Commonwealth is
correct that Kelvin bears the burden of proof on this issue, he
has cited ample evidence from the federal evidentiary hearing
to support the District Court‟s finding that he did not
knowingly and intelligently waive his right to conflict-free
counsel. Any waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to
conflict-free counsel “must be made knowingly, intelligently,
and with awareness of the likely consequences of the waiver.”
United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1180-81 (3d Cir.
1978). A waiver is made “knowingly” and “intelligently”
only if the “defendant is aware of the foreseeable prejudices
his attorney‟s continued representation could entail for his
trial, and possible detrimental consequences of those
prejudices.” Id. at 1181; see also United States v. Laura, 667
F.2d 365, 371 (3d Cir. 1981). The record of the evidentiary
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hearing demonstrates that Kelvin was not provided with the
information he needed to make a valid waiver.
At the hearing, Tucker merely testified that he “spoke”
with both Kelvin and Artie about his concurrent
representation and that both wanted him to continue as their
attorney. App. at 138-39. Unfortunately, Tucker‟s vague
testimony sheds no light on the content of his waiver
discussions with Kelvin. Nowhere does the record suggest,
for example, that Tucker advised Kelvin of the negative
consequences that might flow from the conflict. See United
States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203, 211 (3d Cir.
1973) (holding a defendant may waive counsel‟s conflict as
long as the dangers inherent in joint representation are
explained). Nor is there any suggestion that Kelvin was made
aware of his right to obtain new counsel due to Tucker‟s
conflict.
Finally, and most significantly, Tucker also
suggested that he did not perceive his dual representation of
Kelvin and Artie to present a conflict of interest at the time.
App. at 127. Like the District Court, we question whether an
attorney who admittedly did not understand or appreciate the
magnitude of his conflict could adequately convey the
information necessary for his client to make an informed
waiver. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988)
(“Nor is it amiss to observe that the willingness of an attorney
to obtain such waivers from his clients may bear an inverse
relationship to the care with which he conveys all the
necessary information to them.”). For all the foregoing
reasons, we agree with the District Court that Kelvin was
deprived of the opportunity to make a knowing and intelligent
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waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free
counsel.8
V
We turn finally to the merits of Kelvin‟s conflict-ofinterest claim. Because Kelvin did not object at trial, he must
“demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely
affected his lawyer‟s performance.” United States v. Morelli,
169 F.3d 798, 810 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan,
446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
If Kelvin can make this showing, he “need not demonstrate
prejudice in order to obtain relief.” Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 34950; Morelli, 169 F.3d at 810.
As we noted previously, before holding an evidentiary
hearing, the District Court concluded that Tucker‟s conflict
(assuming he had one) adversely affected his representation.
Accordingly, the evidentiary hearing was held merely to
determine whether an attorney-client relationship existed
between Tucker and Artie during the time in question. At
that hearing, Kelvin‟s counsel established, in a mere seven
pages of transcript, that Tucker represented Artie at the
relevant time before turning the witness over to the
Commonwealth for cross-examination. Presumably because
of Tucker‟s unassailable testimony regarding the existence of
his attorney-client relationship with Artie, the Commonwealth
8

For this reason, the Commonwealth‟s reliance on
United States v. Laura, 667 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1981), is
misplaced. In stark contrast to this case, the dangers of joint
representation were explained to Laura in open court,
allowing “the trial court . . . to evaluate whether [her] waiver
was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” Id. at 371.
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embarked on a line of questioning intended to establish that
this actual conflict of interest had no bearing on Kelvin‟s trial.
Because of the District Court‟s previous ruling regarding
adverse effect, however, the Commonwealth was precluded
from developing the record in any meaningful way in this
regard. As we shall explain, this procedural misstep requires
us to vacate and remand the case for a new evidentiary
hearing.
After cataloguing the evidence implicating Artie, the
District Court found the strategy of identifying him as the
shooter to be an objectively plausible alternative defense.
The District Court then concluded that Tucker avoided this
strategy solely because of his loyalties to Artie and his own
financial stake in Artie‟s civil suit. To the District Court, it
was clear that Tucker‟s actual conflict adversely affected his
handling of Kelvin‟s trial. We are not so sure.
Considered in the abstract, blaming Artie for the
murder was surely a plausible alternative defense strategy.
Although the Commonwealth‟s case centered largely on
eyewitness identifications of Kelvin, other evidence pointed
to Artie as the shooter. Flowers, for example, never wavered
from his initial identification of Artie, even when shown a
photo array that included pictures of both brothers. And
Linaberry—whose testimony was central to the
Commonwealth‟s case—also initially identified Artie.
Finally, the composite sketch that police drew after speaking
with Johnson portrayed a suspect with a damaged eye similar
to Artie‟s. When viewed together, this evidence was more
than sufficient to support an argument that Artie was the
shooter.
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Furthermore, it would be reasonable to infer that
Tucker avoided this alternative defense because of his loyalty
to Artie and his financial stake in Artie‟s civil case. As an
initial matter, common sense suggests that an attorney would
be wary of alienating a client with a potentially lucrative civil
rights claim by accusing him of murder in open court. And
as the District Court noted, Tucker testified that he never
sought to investigate Artie‟s alibi, motive, or opportunity to
commit the crime. Moreover, Tucker took actions at trial that
could be construed as protecting Artie—for example, he
objected when the Commonwealth asked Linaberry to name
the person he initially identified and sought to prevent the
admission of the composite sketch that portrayed a man with
a damaged eye that resembled Artie.
Notwithstanding this evidence, the present record
leaves us unable to determine whether Kelvin has carried his
burden of demonstrating that Tucker‟s conflict, in fact,
adversely affected his representation. At the hearing, Tucker
recalled that Kelvin was quite protective of Artie. App. at
139. Accordingly, Tucker suggested Kelvin would not have
allowed him to portray Artie as the shooter at trial. App. at
127, 139. Specifically, when asked if he would have accused
Artie of the murder at trial, Tucker stated: “it may have . . .
come to the point I would not do that based on what
[Kelvin‟s] position was regarding Artie.” App. at 139. And
when pressed on whether he would have permitted Kelvin‟s
interest in protecting his brother to dictate trial strategy,
Tucker replied: “I probably would have favored [Kelvin‟s]
wishes, especially involving [his] brother.” App. at 146.
Finally, Tucker repeatedly suggested that if pointing the
finger at Artie had been a viable strategy, he would have
withdrawn from one of the representations. App. 128, 149.
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Tucker‟s failure to withdraw from either case suggests that
accusing Artie of being the shooter was not, in fact, a viable
strategy.
The significance of this testimony is twofold. First, it
raises a serious question as to whether portraying Artie as the
shooter was a plausible alternative defense strategy in light of
Kelvin‟s apparent unwillingness to accuse his brother of
murder. To show that the proffered alternative strategy was
plausible, Kelvin must demonstrate “that it possessed
sufficient substance to be a viable alternative.” Morelli, 169
F.3d at 810. However, it would be illogical to say that a
defense theory presented a “viable alternative” where the
defendant expressly forbade his attorney from pursuing it.
The evidence of Kelvin‟s hesitancy causes us to question
whether the strategy of accusing Artie was “not undertaken
due to [Tucker‟s] other loyalties or interests.” Morelli, 169
F.3d at 810 (citing United States v. Gambino, 864 F.2d 1064,
1070-71 (3d Cir. 1988)). Moreover, the fact that a defense
witness (William Meekins) testified that the perpetrator
looked nothing like Kelvin and another defense witness
(Lamont Bruce) testified that three younger men committed
the shooting, suggests that it would have been against
Kelvin‟s interest to point the finger at someone (Artie) who
strongly resembled him.
Simply put, Kelvin must show that Tucker‟s conflict
adversely affected his representation.
Tucker‟s unduly
truncated testimony at the evidentiary hearing raises serious
questions as to whether Kelvin‟s reticence and/or strategic
considerations consistent with Kelvin‟s best interests—rather
than Tucker‟s conflict of interest—led Tucker to avoid
accusing Artie of the shooting. See Gambino, 864 F.2d at
1070-71 (“On the other hand, there is no conflict of interest
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adversely affecting the attorney‟s performance if an attorney
at trial does not raise a defense on behalf of his client because
to do so is not in that client‟s interest even though it is also in
the interest of another client that it not be raised. To the
contrary, that is a coincidence of interests.”).
Proper evaluation of Kelvin‟s conflict claim thus
requires more information than the present record provides
regarding the reason Artie was not implicated in the crime. If
Kelvin‟s antipathy to implicating his brother was sufficiently
strong, it could render the theory implausible. Cf. Winkler v.
Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding plea
bargaining was not a plausible alternative strategy where the
defendant explicitly stated that he was not interested in a plea
and instead “asserted” and “insisted” on his innocence to
defense counsel). If the facts show that Kelvin‟s wishes and
his communications with counsel would have led reasonable
counsel to understand that Kelvin would never agree to
implicate Artie, then doing so could not have been a
“plausible alternative” defense. On the other hand, if the
facts were such that reasonable counsel would have at least
attempted to persuade Kelvin of the wisdom of that strategy,
that approach could have been a “plausible alternative”
defense. Finally, Tucker may have decided not to identify
Artie for legitimate strategic reasons in light of the family
resemblance between Kelvin and Artie. We leave these
issues—as well as any other issues the District Court might
identify in light of this opinion—for review on remand to the
District Court.
VI
For all the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the
District Court‟s decision to conduct an evidentiary hearing on
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Kelvin‟s conflict-of-interest claim. We will likewise affirm
the District Court‟s holding that Kelvin did not waive his
Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel. We will
vacate the District Court‟s order for a new trial, however, and
remand the matter for the District Court to conduct a plenary
evidentiary hearing consistent with this opinion.
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